What choice for the EU? by Shikaki, Khalil
Stability vs. 
Democracy in the 
post Arab-Spring: 
What choice for 
the EU?
Khalil Shikaki
No. 04. January 2020
This publication has been funded by the European Union under 



























Confronted in its southern neighborhood with the choice between continued promotion 
of democratic transitions and the need for stability in the post Arab-Spring environment, 
the EU is tilting to the latter.  Past EU efforts reflected the conviction that peace, stability, 
and prosperity were the outcomes of democracy. But threats of regional conflict, civil wars, 
waves of immigrants, and rise in terror is forcing a rethinking. While searching for stability 
is understandable, supporting a return of authoritarianism is counterproductive. Indeed, a 
return to tyranny in the Arab world has already created significant public discontent that has 
led to a second wave of Arab uprisings. The EU should seek to strengthen societal resilience by 
supporting democratic reforms, for example, by supporting local Arab civil society initiatives. 
Such support should be guided by local priorities, those that address the economic and well as 
the political, educational, and health needs of the Arab public.
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The banner reads: “Investing in Stability.” It is the first-ever EU-Arab summit held in Sharm El-Sheik in 
Egypt in February 2019. Stability, it turned out, meant the management of migration, fighting terror, 
and fostering economic cooperation. And yes, the issue of human rights was mentioned, here and 
there, reluctantly. Nothing concrete was agreed upon; nonetheless, the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel described Arab-European cooperation as vital for the fate of the EU. Donald Tusk, the presi-
dent of the European Council, was blunter:  “one can’t choose one’s neighbours; living in conflict with 
one’s neighbours is not an option; Europe must get along with the Arab countries south and east of 
the Mediterranean”. Of course, there is also a global politics angle; as Tusk put it: “We [Arab countries 
and Europe] need to cooperate and not leave it to global powers far from our region,”1
It seems clear that for the European Union (EU), promoting democracy is in competition with other, 
stronger interests. If Europe wants Arab countries to hold back a potential flood of refugees, to pick just 
one of those stronger interests, it cannot be too critical of Arab regimes, regardless of how oppressive 
they are. It is tempting to turn a blind eye to the return to authoritarianism in the Arab region. The EU 
seems to want to pursue friendly relations with authoritarian regimes and downplay its interest in pro-
moting democracy for the sake of power politics interests.  In prioritizing security and other interests 
over democracy promotion, the EU’s unspoken assumption is that the process of democratization is it-
self a potential source of instability. About two decades earlier, soon after 9/11, the assumption was that 
the lack of democracy is the root cause of extremism. Now, what is cause and what is effect is in doubt. 
What would have looked like conflating cause and effect is now seen as sound and prudent policy. 
Let us face it: Western interest in Arab democracy has never been driven by ideals. If in conflict with sta-
bility, the latter has always won. Upsetting the status quo brings risks and costs. Over the past several 
decades, Western interest in political reform in the MENA region has been driven by realpolitik interests: 
combat extreme violence and terror, reduce or manage demand for illegal migration, increase trade and 
investment opportunities, and ensure uninterrupted flow of oil and gas. When political stability was suffi-
cient to deliver these goals, Europe and the United States (US) tolerated, sometimes even embraced, the 
prevailing status quo of oppression and authoritarianism. When stability was seen as failing to deliver, 
for example, after 9/11, interest in the promotion of democracy grew in Washington and Brussels.
ARAB RESPONSE TO WESTERN 
PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY
We also need to face another truth, this time from the region itself: very few have faith in Western 
commitment to Arab democracy, come what may. Most Arabs are indeed reluctant to embrace an 
EU-driven effort at democracy promotion. Why? Because they question the motivation of outside ac-
tors, believe that outside-driven reforms will most likely have a hidden agenda and will fail to address 
the priorities of the public in the region. The hidden agenda theory gained credence after 9/11, when 
promotion of democracy turned into regime change in Iraq; also in January 2006 when Western 
countries refused to recognize the outcome of Palestinian elections after Hamas’ electoral victory; 
and during the Arab Spring when, after an initial support, Western interests sharply shifted to a focus 
on stemming the influx of refugees and to combating terror. 


























One can marshal evidence that shows that outside-driven reforms are insufficient to trigger a real transi-
tion to democracy. Five rounds of the Arab Democracy Index (ADI), carried out between 2008 and 2015, 
show that outside-driven reforms, before and after the Arab Spring, seem to succeed in influencing the 
legal, or formal, context of governance, but not the practices of Arab governments. The latest wave 
shows a decline in the status of democratization driven by declining scores of indicators measuring 
regime “practices,” e.g., torture or closing down media outlets, but not in the scores of the indicators that 
measure the “means” of transitions, i.e., the legal and constitutional framework, most driven by outside 
actors.2 ArabTrans surveys, conducted in 2014 in six Arab MENA countries, found that the EU is not be-
lieved to have a positive influence on democratic transitions and that the Arab publics believed that the 
EU was more interested in stabilizing its borders and protecting its own security.3 
The EU and the US, a majority of Arabs believe, will support democracy in Arab countries, if at all, only 
as long as it produces friendly governments and stable economic and security conditions; i.e., an out-
come-based or conditioned democracy. But democratic processes and transitions are messy and un-
predictable. For example, as we have learned during the past decade (and indeed earlier), wholly fair and 
free elections might produce ground shattering results, unexpectedly and dramatically redesigning the 
political landscape. On March 2, 2006, the House International Relations Committee Hearing on U.S. 
Policy Toward the Palestinians, which argued successfully for terminating U.S. assistance to the newly 
elected PA government, was opened with the Chairman Henry Hyde (R-Illinois) congratulating the Pales-
tinian people for conducting “what were arguably the freest and fairest democratic elections in the Arab 
world.”4 The US and the EU liked the process but hated the outcome and ended up throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater and discrediting Western democracy promotion for a long time to come. 
But the EU is not alone in promoting an outcome-based democracy. Survey research shows that 
a share of Arab public opinion tends to judge their own countries’ transitions to democracy based 
on a similar cost-benefit calculus. Arab Barometer’s (AB) findings show that most Arabs embrace 
outcome-based transitions: if a transition fails to deliver, as the post Arab-Spring years have shown, 
many voices among the Arab publics, in most Arab countries, rush to the conclusion that democracy 
is not, perhaps, appropriate for their countries. This belief in the inappropriateness of democracy is 
firmest among those most disadvantaged by the process of transition, those who lose power, but 
also those who feel less secure or more impoverished.5 
The fifth wave of the AB shows continued significant public support in the MENA region for the 
concept of democracy. But demand for democracy is influenced by concerns about other badly felt 
conditions. For some, demand for democracy might, in fact, be in conflict with demand for economic 
opportunity, security, enforcement of law and order, and perceived equality.  Given the many prevail-
ing challenges, Arabs today seem to place democracy at the bottom. According to the latest wave of 
the AB, democracy appeared as one of the top 10 Arab priorities, but only at the bottom; indeed, only 
2% of the Arab public considered it a top priority.6 It could not compete with economic conditions, 
2. Arab Democracy Index 5, June 2017: http://pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/ADI5%20-%20Report%20Summary%20-%20English.pdf
3. Andrea Teti and Pamela Abbott, “Perceptions of the EU in MENA Public Opinion,” Arab Transformations, Policy Brief 2, April 2017
4. United States Policy Toward the Palestinians in the Aftermath of Parliamentary Elections, Hearing Before the Committee on Interna-
tional Relations, House of Representative, one hundred ninth Congress, Second Session, March 2, 2006: http://commdocs.house.
gov/committees/intlrel/hfa26332.000/hfa26332_0.htm
5. Findings and country reports of the Wave V of the Arab Barometer can be accessed here: https://www.arabbarometer.org/waves/
arab-barometer-wave-v/
6. Wave V of AB. Similarly, the Zogby 2018 polls in six MENA countries showed that democracy came as priority 8,9, or 10 out of 10 
priorities offered to respondents. See, Middle East Public Opinion, 2018, Zogby Research Services, LLC, see: https://static1.square-
space.com/static/52750dd3e4b08c252c723404/t/5c0fcb2e758d461f72dc37ca/1544538926539/2018+SBY+FINAL+WEB.pdf
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corruption, service delivery, safety and security, foreign intervention and terrorism. “Economic condi-
tions” was selected by 38% of the Arab public and it came on top of all others in 10 out of 12 coun-
tries surveyed by the fifth wave of the AB. The two exceptions were Iraq, in which corruption came 
on top, selected by 33%, and Libya, in which safety and stability came on top, with 36% selecting it.  
These findings are echoed in the current wave of Arab uprisings, in Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, and Lebanon. 
The current uprisings demonstrate the change in the hierarchy of priorities of the Arab publics. The 
primary focus is on improving the quality of daily living conditions. More than two thirds in these 
and almost all other countries describe governance in their countries as bad or very bad, the worst 
evaluation in more than a decade of the AB. But perhaps the most telling expression of dissatisfac-
tion can be found in the perception of government corruption, standing at 84% for the entire region. 
Perception of corruption is also one of the most significant indicators of discontent, as people blame 
their society’s economic and political ills on it. Almost all 12 governments in the last wave of the AB 
are seen as corrupt by at least three-quarters of their peoples. 
The focus of the Arab public on the need to improve daily living conditions does not mean that they 
are not interested in improving governance or that they reject democracy. Arabs do not think that 
democracy is inherently bad. Instead, they have adopted an outcome-based approach to democracy, 
one that delivers not only legitimacy and the rule of law, but also prosperous socio-economic con-
ditions. This mindset led many more people in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon 
to wonder if their countrymen were ready for democracy or if democracy was appropriate for their 
countries. For example, while 68% of Egyptians thought in late 2011 that democracy is appropriate 
to their country, this percentage dropped dramatically to 40% in early 2013. 
Three explanations are supported by AB findings: declining perceptions of safety and security, wors-
ening economic conditions, and a growing perception of inequality due to rising sectarianism and 
corruption. Tunisia, the most successful example of transition to democracy since 2011, is just one 
example. It is a success, not because of EU or US promotion of democracy; there has been almost 
nothing of that anyway. Yet, among all 12 Arab publics the Tunisian public has been the most dis-
satisfied with government performance. Why? Because governmental focus was placed on political 
reforms rather than improving economic conditions. This led to a problem. The fifth round of the AB 
shows that the Tunisians are the unhappiest about economic conditions and among the most pessi-
mistic about the future of their economic conditions. Despite being the most positive about their own 
freedom of expression, Tunisians are among the least trusting of their own government.
WHAT SHOULD THE EU DO?
There are tangible stakes for the EU in the spread of democracy. The Barcelona Process and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, created in 1995, that aimed at fostering political pluralism remain 
valid today. It brings greater peace and prosperity as it provides peaceful means of resolving conflict 
and unleashes the potential for innovation and initiative. Stability flows from pluralistic domestic 
politics, one built on the rule of law and peaceful competition. But instead of imposing democracy or 
pressuring repressive regimes to reform, the EU should instead simply avoid strengthening authori-
tarianism. It should not provide moral or material support that can entrench repressive regimes. The 
same should apply to member states with the EU making it its business that its member states ob-

























Arab-EU summit in February 2019, the EU countries should balance that support by strongly echoing 
and supporting domestic civil societies’ calls for reform rather than maintain neutrality. 
If support to local civil society initiative is adopted as the means to strengthen societal resilience, it 
should be guided, at least in part, by local civil society priorities and it should include those grass-
roots organizations in the peripheries. This makes it difficult for repressive regimes to frame the 
local initiatives as outside-driven. Although the EU is the most trusted Western actor,7 engaging and 
supporting civil society in the MENA region can be made more effective if done in cooperation with 
international actors and with the European civil society. But it should be clear from the outset that 
this approach is slow and will not bring about a democratic transition until local conditions mature 
and local demand for democracy reaches a critical mass. 
In a pre-transition environment, any attempt to condition economic support on political reform, no 
matter how noble and well-intentioned, will be perceived as interference in domestic politics. Given 
the historical legacy of European-Arab relations, such interference will probably be seen as part of a 
conspiracy against the Arabs, aiming at forcing their rulers to make compromises that benefit only 
those who seek to impose the conditionality and ensure their country’s continued dependence on 
foreigners. Instead, the EU should take the long view: focus should be on the next generation. This 
means investment in local civil societies’ initiatives in education and combating corruption, support-
ing local programmes that promote transparency, critical thinking, tolerance, the value of diversity, 
and the need for inclusion. One should keep in mind that the problem is not just with governments 
but also with publics that are either apathetic or impatient. 
Ultimately, the most important role for the EU should not be to trigger a transition to democracy but 
to help consolidate one once it begins to show signs of success. Here again, Tunisia should imme-
diately come to mind. In its current phase, the EU should seek to reward progress in consolidating 
democracy, linking its support to progress in delivering deeper and more enduring political reforms 
while keeping in mind that for Tunisians promotion of democracy means EU support in job creation, 
health and education.
Finally, in all cases, no genuine democratic transition should be punished, as it was the case with 
Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006. After all, what we have learned from that experience is that punish-
ing successful transitions can have catastrophic consequences. 
7. The Zogby polls show that the EU and China earn the highest favourability ratings of the seven countries offered to respondents. 
The EU is viewed favourably by majorities in eight of the 10 countries surveyed Middle East Public Opinion, 2018, Zogby Research 
Services, LLC
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